Projects
Meaning and Belief in Non-Human Animals (Work in Progress)
In this paper I defend an unorthodox view of meaning and belief on which even very simple non-human animals can mean and believe. According to this view, a movement is meaningful iff it is produced by a participant in a practice exhibiting a normative structure I call “Structure-M”. To earn the status of a participant in this practice, an animal must be responsive to the demands of other participants, where participants are properly held to account for some movements but not others and are entitled to hold other participants to account for some movements but not others (this is “Structure-M”). This practice is very undemanding because 1) to be responsive to the demands of other participants one need not be capable of recognizing other participants as participants, and 2) to be entitled to hold other participants to account one need not be capable of doing so. Given (1) and (2) even very simple non-humans can be participants and can therefore perform meaningful movements. Turning to belief, a disposition to move is a belief iff it is possessed by a participant in a practice involving both Structure-M and representational norms. This practice is slightly more demanding than the previous one because in order to successfully participate in it an animal must realize capacities required for perception. However, a wide range of non-human animals can still participate in it. Given the practice-dependence of meaning and belief, considerations relevant for determining whether a non-human animal is able to perform a meaningful utterance or have a belief ultimately turn on considerations relevant to the selection of practices.
Animal Flexibility and Inter-Species Practices (Presented at the York Conference in Animal Minds)
I begin this paper with the suggestion that the Cartesian had mistakenly interpreted non-responsiveness to accountability as inflexibility, where the former but not the latter can be redressed by altering our evaluative practices. I then consider several non-linguistic inter-species practices that may contribute to fuller recognition of non-human animal flexibility. The first two of these treat animal behavior as ‘rational’ insofar as it accords with a narrow-scoped instrumental principle with either biological fitness or objective well-being as its end. In these practices, when a non-human animal behaves ‘rationally’ they prima facie warrant a response in which we contribute to the achievement of the relevant end (either biological fitness or objective well-being), while when an animal behaves ‘irrationally’ they prima facie warrant a response in which we either set them back on course or exclude them from the practice. I argue that participation in these practices is not best for the recognition of animal flexibility because, among other reasons, humans can successfully participate in them while neglecting the mental lives of non-human animals. After a brief foray into a discussion of what I call ‘objectifying’ practices, I then discuss an inter-species practice in which an animal’s behaviors are ‘rational’ insofar as they contribute to the achievement of its goals, where such goals are expressed in its behaviors. I suggest that participation in a version of this practice in which the animal's goals provide prima facie reasons to be considered in light of other reasons is preferable for the recognition of objective flexibility to the others because sensitivity to the goals of animals calls attention to behaviors exhibiting what I call 'rational free play' and is an important ingredient in the production of social scaffolds. However, I suggest that the conception of objective flexibility to be discerned through participation in such a practice may extend too widely, showing up in such phenomena as a heat-seeking missile and a double-rod pendulum. I end with some speculation about whether there is room for a conception of objective flexibility that is both insensitive to parochial evaluative practices and yet thick enough to maintain a distinction between at least some animates and all inanimates.
Thick and Thin Conceptions of Agency (Presented at the Neuchâtel Action Conference)
By arguing that moral norms are grounded in agency in the same way that dog-norms are grounded in dogs and cup-norms are grounded in cups, constitutivists promise to provide a powerful response to moral skeptics. However, hopes are tempered once it is noticed that constitutivists disagree about the basic norms of agency. In response to this disagreement, Douglas Lavin has recently developed a ‘pluralist constitutivism’ in which different conceptions of agency are thought to be distinct forms of agency. In this paper, I argue that a consequence of Lavin’s approach is an objectionably thin conception of agency as such. Finally, I end by speculating about the prospects of developing a ‘restricted pluralism’ which preserves a thick conception of agency while leaving room for forms of agency.
There is an ambition in some quarters to conceive of the human being as a composite of perceptual/desiderative faculties belonging to a causal order and a rational faculty belonging to a normative order. The problem is that this conception is inherently unstable: If we locate the perceptual/desiderative faculties in a causal order, no room is left for the rational faculty. Consequently, to conceive of the human being in full, one would have to alternate between two very different points of view. In this paper, I argue that the solution is to reevaluate how we think about causes and norms: To say something is constrained by causes is not or not just to locate it within a causal order but is rather or more fundamentally to exclude it from our evaluative practices. Further, to say something is constrained by norms is not or not just to identify a set of evaluative practices but is rather or more fundamentally to include it in our evaluative practices. Once we’ve accepted this ‘practice-based’ view of causes and norms, we can conceive of the human being from a single viewpoint as both rational and subject to perceptions and desires.